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ABSTRACT 
Background: Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in a Part D drug plan are faced with choosing 
from a large number of plans with a complex array of attributes. Unnecessarily high spending 
may lead to cost-related non-adherence (CRN). The extent to which changes in spending are 
attributable to sponsor renewal of plans offered (compared to termination or consolidation), or 
beneficiary plan switching (compared to not switching), is not well known. 
Research Aims: This study evaluated whether 1) unanticipated plan consolidations or 
terminations lead to higher gross total and patient out-of-pocket (OOP) costs compared to plan 
renewals, and 2) plan switching is associated with gross total and patient OOP costs. 
Methods: We used Part D data from N=1,187,469 beneficiaries enrolled between 2006 and 2012 
who never received income subsidies and who were enrolled continuously through December to 
January of two consecutive years. Beneficiaries were classified into one of five plan switching 
groups at each transition period: plan termination—switch (PT-S), plan consolidation—switch 
(PC-S) or no switch (PC-NS), and plan renewal—switch (PR-S) or no switch (PR-NS). 
Longitudinal mixed models using an analytical sample of N=17,812 beneficiaries evaluated plan 
switching group effect on gross total and patient OOP costs, controlling for covariates. Linear 
mixed models (LMM) and mixture models were compared. 
Results: Model diagnostics suggested that the mixture model provided a better fit than LMM. 
Neither plan termination nor consolidation led to consistently higher gross total spending or 
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patient OOP costs. The lowest gross costs were observed in the PC-S group, with spending in 
PC-NS, PR-NS and PR-S estimated to be 4.6%, 6.9% and 5.2% higher, respectively. Patient 
OOP spending was significantly higher among PC-NS and PR-NS compared to PC-S and PR-S. 
Estimated differences were between 4.8% and 7.5%, equivalent to $24 to $60 higher annual 
patient OOP spending among individuals who did not switch compared to those that switched. 
Conclusions: The public health impact of our results is that increased spending may not be a 
significant concern for individuals exposed to plan consolidation or termination. However, plan 
switching may not reduce spending (and consequently risk of CRN) as much as has been shown 
to be possible in previous studies. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 MEDICARE PART D 
Medicare Part D was introduced in 2006 as a result of the Medicare Modernization Act of 2003, 
and was intended to increase seniors’ access to prescription drugs 1. In many ways the program 
has performed successfully, as the proportion of Medicare beneficiaries without drug coverage 
was reduced from 33% to 10%, utilization of essential drugs has risen,2 and consumer 
satisfaction is high.3 Despite its successes, Part D has often been scrutinized for its complexity, 
which many argue has caused seniors to have difficulty benefitting optimally. 
These concerns stem from an essential feature which sets Part D apart from Medicare 
Parts A and B where beneficiaries receive a one-size-fits-all benefit package with uniform 
coverage for everyone. In Part D, beneficiaries choose their prescription drug coverage from 
private insurance providers on a government subsidized marketplace. Instead of a uniform 
benefit, in Part D seniors are faced with a choice between potentially dozens of plans, the exact 
number and nature of which may change from year to year, and which may vary with respect to a 
number of attributes. When the program was initiated in 2006 all Medicare-eligible individuals 
were required to choose a Part D drug plan or present evidence of creditable coverage or face a 
monetary penalty. Although beneficiaries were permitted to switch plans as needed at any time 
during 2006, in subsequent years this activity has only been permitted during the designated 
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open enrollment period, running from October 15 to December 7. Selected plans take effect 
January 1. As a result of beneficiary’s responsibility to select their own drug coverage, their 
ability of to efficiently navigate the program has been of concern practically since inception. 
There are two ways to receive drug coverage through Part D. The first option, 
prescription drug (PDP) plans, provide stand-alone drug coverage that allows beneficiaries to 
remain enrolled in fee-for-service Parts A and/or B for medical outpatient and inpatient medical 
services, respectively. All Medicare beneficiaries are enrolled in Part A, whereas Part B coverage 
is optional. Medicare Advantage (MA) plans provide an alternative to the fee-for-service 
structure of Parts A and B, and through which beneficiaries receive their Part A and Part B 
benefits through private health plans. These plans, also called Medicare Part C or Medicare Plus 
Plans, are often structured as managed care organizations (MCOs). Sponsors offering MA plans 
are generally required to offer at least one plan that is extended to provide prescription drug 
coverage, referred to as MA-PD plans.4 Beneficiaries pay a capitated (per person) fee to receive 
Parts A and B benefits through their MA plans, but through the Part D portion of MA-PD plans 
essentially subject to the same payment mechanisms as beneficiaries enrolled in PDP plans. 
A primary criticism of the Part D program is that plan characteristics are confusingly 
numerous and the benefit schedule is complex. The Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services 
(CMS) requires all plans (PDP and MA-PD) to conform to a non-linear benefit schedule in 
which year-to-date spending marks beneficiaries’ progression through 4 benefit phases, 
ultimately determining their marginal out of pocket (OOP) costs. Each year, the standard PDP 
plan benefit includes an initial deductible, a second phase characterized by a 25% coinsurance, a 
coverage gap (i.e. the “donut hole”) in which the beneficiary is subject to 100% of costs, and a 
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final catastrophic coverage period with a 5% coinsurance.5 The cycle then restarts on January 1st 
of each year.  
The coverage gap, which places significant financial burden particularly on individuals 
with high drug costs, has been a source of considerable concern. Once an individual has reached 
the coverage gap, the likelihood of medication discontinuation increases,2,6 which in turn may 
lead to greater health risks and associated medical costs.7 Called cost-related medication non-
adherence (CRN), this phenomenon is well-documented in Medicare Part D and has been 
observed as recently 2014.8,9,10 Although increased CRN is associated with lower incomes,10 the 
problem has also been reported in older persons with mental illness who exceed qualification 
requirements for the low-income-subsidy (LIS).11 In 2012 the initial coverage limit for entry into 
the gap was $2,930 for the standard benefit, and the catastrophic coverage limit was $6,730, 
although the specific threshold amounts for the standard benefit increase slightly every year.5 At 
the start of the Part D program about 94% of PDP plans and 73% of MA-PD plans offered little 
to no drug coverage in the gap.12 While the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 
2010 has required a 50% price discount for brand-name drugs and 14% coverage of generic drug 
costs in the gap, 94% of PDPs and 62% of MA-PDs still did not offer any additional gap 
coverage in 2012 above the mandated minimum.12 The Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) of 2010 has made it a priority to address the problem by gradually phasing out the 
coverage gap by 2020.13 
Gap coverage and other attributes are permitted to differ between Part D plans as long as 
sponsors demonstrate that their plans are “actuarially equivalent” to, or have the same overall 
value as, the CMS-defined standard benefit. This flexibility extends to a variety of characteristics 
in addition to gap coverage, including specific premiums costs, cost-sharing, formularies, 
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catastrophic coverage, and utilization management policies for specific medication classes. In 
fact, the number of plans offering the standard benefit in 2012 was far outnumbered by plans 
offering an alternative (but actuarially equivalent) benefit package.14 Furthermore, the specific 
selection of PDP plans offered may vary across the 34 PDP and 26 designated MA-PD plan 
regions, and plan offerings can change on a yearly basis. A typical beneficiary had between 45 to 
57 PDP plans and 36 to 51 MA-PD plans to choose from in 2009 depending on the county, while 
in 2014 the average number had decreased to 35 PDP and 15 MA-PD plans.5,15,16 In 2012, out of 
31.5 million Medicare beneficiaries enrolled in drug plans, 19.6 million were enrolled in PDPs 
and 11.7 million in MA-PDs.14 
1.2 PART D PLAN CHOICES 
As described above, the Part D program is characterized by a complex benefit design, high 
variability of attributes between plans, and a potentially large choice set for beneficiaries. In a 
2006 survey, about 70% of those enrolled felt that there were too many alternative plans to 
choose from despite a perceived usefulness of these options, 52% had difficulty understanding 
how Part D works, and 54% felt that it was difficult to determine whether specific medications 
were covered by the plans on offer.3 Another early study revealed that 30% of beneficiaries did 
not know whether their chosen plan provided gap coverage.17 
Some attribute this confusion to the more general concept of “choice overload” occurring 
in markets with too many competing products, causing consumers to experience impaired 
decision making.15  A study by Tanius et al. has shown this to be the case when seniors were 
asked to rate a series of fictional prescription drug plans after being given just a subset of the 
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attributes beneficiaries are faced with when choosing among Medicare plans, including drug 
premium prices, cost sharing prices, and distance to the closest pharmacy. Their results indicate 
that that increasing choice set size significantly affects individuals’ ability to choose the best 
plan.19 To avoid unnecessary redundancy in plan offerings on the Part D marketplace, the CMS 
became more active in 2008 and 2009 in denying sponsors the ability to sell plans that were too 
similar to plans already sold by the same provider.18 Moreover, in 2010 CMS issued regulations 
to eliminate redundant plans and plans with low enrollment in order to further address the 
problem of choice overload. Due to this policy the total number of PDP plans dropped from 
1,576 in 2010 to 1,109 in 2011.14 
Plan continuity from year to year is not always assured for non-redundant plans, either. 
There are essentially 4 possible outcomes for a given Part D plan. Most sponsors renew their 
plan contracts with CMS each year. However, sponsors are free to change particulars such as 
premium prices and cost-sharing even when plans are renewed.4,5,12,14,15 Sponsors may also 
choose to consolidate several pre-existing plans under one contract, for example in response to 
an acquisition or merger; other plans are split into several different contracts or terminated by the 
sponsor.21 In addition, CMS has given yearly ratings to all plans since 2008, out of 5 stars. Plans 
with ratings of less than 3 stars for 3 consecutive years are subject to termination.14 
Given the complexity of the Part D landscape, what kinds of decisions have beneficiaries 
made with regard to plan choice? In a given year, the non-LIS population was likely to be 
enrolled in plans that are more than $300 more expensive than the cheapest plan, and often 
selected plans with features that were overprotective such as generic coverage in the gap.21,22 It is 
estimated that about 5.2% of beneficiaries choose the cheapest plan.21 
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1.3 PLAN SWITCHING 
Despite being enrolled in plans with seemingly excessive and inappropriate features and costing 
hundreds of dollars more per year on average than necessary, most Medicare Part D beneficiaries 
choose not to change plans. Among all non-LIS beneficiaries continuously enrolled in a PDP 
plan, only about 13% switched plans in a given year between 2006 and 2010, with more than 
70% remaining in the same plan throughout that time.20 Realizing this, the CMS recommends 
that beneficiaries review their enrollment annually.23-25 CMS has also implemented a web-based 
tool to facilitate this process, the Medicare Plan Finder, enabling beneficiaries to quickly 
compare plans and identify differences in characteristics and pricing. Despite these attempts plan 
switching rates are relatively low and effective plan optimization is uncommon. The effects of 
this tendency for Part D beneficiaries to remain enrolled in the same plan year after year are well 
illustrated by Han et al. who point out that in 2006 the insurance company Humana had the 
lowest premiums and nearly the highest enrollment among all Part D plans.26 Over the next three 
years Humana increased premiums by up to 4 times while maintaining an equivalent share of the 
market. This trend is true in general, as premiums for both PDP and MA-PD plans have 
continued to rise on average almost 50% from 2006 to 2012.14 Han et al. propose that suboptimal 
plan choices of most beneficiaries may be due to their reluctance to re-evaluate plans each year, 
a process which they necessarily experienced in their first year of Part D enrollment and may not 
want to revisit.14 This corresponds with results from a study suggesting that seniors may base 
their decisions disproportionately on premium prices, which were lowest in the early years of 
Part D.27 
However, the degree to which this population has learned to navigate the Part D program 
by exercising their ability to switch plans each year is not as well understood. The only studies to 
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examine this directly have examined overspending, calculated as the difference between actual 
spending and hypothetical OOP costs under the plan with the minimum OOP costs for that 
individual. Ketcham et al. observed decreases in overspending 2006 to 2007 among non-LIS 
beneficiaries and attributed the savings to consumer learning and plan switching, which was 
more frequent among those who increased their savings.28 However, a separate study found that 
overspending increased in 2007-2008 compared to 2006-2007.22 While these efforts have 
increased our understanding of the dynamics of plan choices in the Part D program, they largely 
been limited by cross-sectional approaches or consideration of just a few years of data.20,22,28 As 
a result these studies have not been equipped to control for time when measuring the effects of 
switching on plan outcomes. Moreover, these studies have uniformly excluded individuals’ 
enrolled in Part D plans that are terminated or consolidated with other plans by the sponsor. In 
such unanticipated situations the beneficiary is involuntarily “forced” to either switch plans (as 
in the case of plan terminations) or may be unprepared to appropriately evaluate automatic 
changes in their plans (plan consolidation). Beneficiaries who do not switch plans also may or 
may not understand that even renewed plans’ attributes may not be consistent with previous 
years. In the LIS population, which is subject to automatic plan enrollment and plan switching 
based on the level of coverage offered by the subsidy, forced plan switching has been shown to 
lead to overspending and potentially harmful utilization review policies that limit beneficiaries’ 
use of necessary medications. It therefore stands to reason that the portion of the non-LIS 
population which is subject to unanticipated or unwanted changes in its prescription drug plans, 
yet does not react to them, may potentially be negatively affected. 
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1.4 RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The effects of plan switching under the potentially unanticipated or involuntary 
circumstances of plan terminations or consolidations is not well documented. Furthermore, 
studies of plan switching have focused on measuring the benefits of a hypothetical plan switch 
by calculating the difference between actual spending and hypothetical spending under a 
cheaper plan.  This approach may not be accurate if assumptions incorporated into the 
hypothetical spending calculations are not met, for example if economic demand for a 
particular drug is not stable given changes in prices.28 Finally, the handful of studies 
evaluating the effects of switching plans in the non-LIS population have been mostly 
limited to a couple years of information, leading to conflicting reports as to the degree of 
benefit associated with switching plans and the strength of choices across a wide range of years. 
In order to address these gaps in the literature, we conducted a longitudinal study of non-
LIS beneficiaries enrolled in Part D between 2006 and 2012, incorporating actual spending. The 
current study therefore seeks to evaluate two primary research questions: 
1) Is there a negative effect of plan terminations and plan consolidations on gross total
costs and patient OOP spending compared to plan renewals?
2) Is plan switching associated with lower gross total costs and OOP spending compared
to not switching plans?
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2.0  METHODS 
2.1 STUDY SAMPLE 
2.1.1 Exclusion criteria 
The current study utilized Medicare data from years 2006 to 2012, inclusive. Two exclusion 
criteria were applied when constructing the study sample. First, we excluded beneficiaries that 
had received the LIS or state buy-in subsidy during at least one month during the study period. 
Included in this group were individuals who were dually eligible for Medicaid as well as 
Medicare (dual-eligible), which entitles individuals to copayments as low as $0 throughout the 
benefit cycle, including the coverage gap. These individuals may therefore not be as sensitive to 
changes in their plan characteristics that might provide motivation for switching among the non-
poor. Furthermore, dual-eligible beneficiaries are automatically randomized to a low-cost 
“benchmark” PDP plan unless they make another choice. If they chose a plan costing more than 
the benchmark amount covered by the LIS, the beneficiary is responsible for the difference. This 
feature not only provides the motivation to remain enrolled in a smaller selection of 
“benchmark” plans, but it also limits the ability of beneficiaries to remain passively enrolled in 
the same plan if that plan loses “benchmark” status. The effects of automatic assignment for LIS 
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beneficiaries have been studied elsewhere, 29,30 and for the purposes of the current study this sub-
population has been removed. 
 Although CMS policy requires enrollment in some type of drug plan, continuous 
enrollment in Part D is not required if beneficiaries elect to receive benefits through another 
provider (e.g. receive “creditable coverage”). Some beneficiaries were not continuously enrolled 
in the Part D program, and re-enrolled after a period of time during which they did not receive 
the benefit. These beneficiaries were not necessarily excluded from the study. However, after the 
first discontinuation they were treated as though they did not re-enroll; in other words 
beneficiaries were treated as not enrolled in Part D for the entire period following first 
discontinuation.  
The second exclusion criterion was applied after determining the first month of 
discontinuation. This criterion stipulated that individuals were excluded if they had not been 
enrolled in a Part D plan for at least one continuous two-month period from December of one 
year to January of the next year (i.e. Dec-Jan transition period). The focus of the study is on end-
of-year plan switching in which new plans chosen during the enrollment period are initiated in 
January. Therefore, beneficiaries not enrolled during the Dec-Jan transition period were not able 
to contribute to the analysis and were excluded. 
The application of the second exclusion criterion is represented in Figure 1. Panel A 
represents hypothetical enrollment data from an individual who was enrolled in a Part D plan 
from January to December of 2008, but not enrolled for all other months. Because this period 
does not include a Dec-Jan transition period, this individual would have been excluded from the 
final sample. On the other hand, the beneficiary represented in Panel B was continuously 
enrolled during the period from October 2007 to December 2012, a timeframe including 5 
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transition periods. The individual in Panel B would have been included in the sample. Finally, 
panel C1 illustrates a scenario where a beneficiary was enrolled for a continuous period from 
December 2006 to January 2008, not enrolled for the duration of 2009, and then enrolled again 
for a period beginning in January 2010. Panel C2 shows enrollment information for this 
individual as it was analyzed for the current study, where the individual was treated as not 
enrolled for the entire period following first discontinuation.  
2.1.2 Sample size 
Table 1 provides sample sizes before and after exclusion criteria were applied. Prior to excluding 
any beneficiaries, each annual dataset had between 2.5 and 3 million individuals. After merging 
the annual datasets together and removing individuals who were not enrolled in Part D through at 
least one enrollment period, the sample size included just over 2 million unique beneficiaries. 
After fully restricting the sample to those who never received the LIS, final total sample 
consisted of N=1,187,469 unique beneficiaries. 
2.2 PLAN SWITCHING 
Although Part D plan enrollees are permitted to switch prescription drug plans at any time, they 
are disincentivized from switching outside of the designated Part D enrollment period by 
charging a fee for this activity. In addition, plan termination, consolidation and splitting only 
take effect on January 1. Therefore this study focused on plan switching events taking effect after 
the Dec-Jan transition period.  
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Enrollment period plan switching was classified into five types depending on whether 
switching occurred and whether the previous year’s plan was renewed, terminated, consolidated 
with other plans or split into multiple plans. Most plans are renewed by the plan sponsor each 
year. Under these circumstances a beneficiary may choose to keep their enrollment in this plan or 
switch to a new one. In certain cases, several plans may be consolidated into one plan the 
following year, or alternatively one plan may be split into several. However, consolidations 
occur much more frequently than splitting (not shown), and henceforth all consolidations and 
splits will be simply referred to as consolidations. In cases of plan consolidation the enrollee is 
notified of the change and is automatically enrolled in the new plan unless the enrollee 
voluntarily chooses another. A plan that is marked as terminated indicates that the sponsor did 
not renew the previous year’s plan, nor was it consolidated. Terminated plans lead to the enrollee 
losing Part D coverage unless they voluntarily choose a new plan. To summarize, the five types 
of switching are as follows: 
 
1. Plan termination—Switch (PT-S):  The previous year’s plan was terminated by the 
sponsor and the enrollee was forced to actively choose another plan to receive any 
coverage.  
2. Plan consolidation—No switch (PC-NS): The previous year’s plan was consolidated or 
split by the sponsor and the beneficiary chose to remain enrolled in the “matched” plan 
the following year. 
3. Plan consolidation—Switch (PC-S): The previous year’s plan was consolidated and the 
beneficiary chose to switch to a new plan the following year. 
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4. Plan renewal—Switch (PR-S): The sponsor renewed the plan the beneficiary was 
previously enrolled in, but the beneficiary actively chose a new plan. 
5. Plan renewal—No switch (PR-NS): The sponsor renewed the plan the beneficiary was 
previously enrolled in, and the beneficiary chose to remain enrolled. 
2.3 OUTCOMES 
The primary motivation for this study was to gain a better understanding of the effects of plan 
switching on prescription drug plan spending. Spending was evaluated on two levels: gross total 
drug cost, and patient OOP spending. 
Gross total drug cost was calculated as the sum of the ingredient cost, dispensing fee, 
sales tax, and the vaccine administration fee if applicable. This value reflects the price paid for 
the drug at the point of sale. Therefore the gross total cost included a portion covered by the 
sponsor, the portion that the patient pays out of pocket, and a portion paid by third-party payers 
if applicable. Exclusion criteria limited the research sample to those without the LIS, excluding 
the federal government as a possible payer, but other third party payers may have included 
employers and liability insurers.31 The amount paid out of pocket by the beneficiary was 
examined as a separate outcome. This amount represented the cost of the prescription drug event 
paid by the beneficiary, which includes all copayments, coinsurance and deductibles. 
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2.4 STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
2.4.1 Analysis of repeated measures data using linear mixed models 
In order to understand the effects of switching on drug spending over time, we require a 
statistical analysis which appropriately evaluates this relationship. Because we are interested in 
estimating the effects of switching on plan spending, adjusting for covariates, the logical starting 
point is the basic class of multiple linear regression models. Assuming that our data are normally 
distributed, let us define this model as: 
y = XTβ + ε . 
Let y denote the vector of observed outcome values y = {y1, y2, …, yn}’ where n is the total 
number of observations; let β denote the vector of fixed effects parameters β ={α, β1, β2, …, βp}’ 
where α is the common intercept and p is the number of fixed effects; X denotes the design 
matrix of dimension n*(p+1), containing covariate data for each observation; and ε represents the 
vector of residuals ε = { ε1, ε2, …, εn}’, which are assumed independent and identically 
distributed (IID) random variables distributed normally with mean yi – XiT β and variance σe2, 
where yi and Xi  are the values of y and vector of predictor values corresponding to the ith 
individual, respectively.  Note the independent variance structure (i.e. all covariance terms are 
equal to 0) for the observations assumed in this model represented by n*n matrix E:  
Enxn =  
⎝
⎜
⎛
σ𝑒𝑒
200    0σ𝑒𝑒20    00σ𝑒𝑒2 ⋯ 000
⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 0 0 ⋯ σ𝑒𝑒2⎠⎟
⎞
 , 
Furthermore, each observation in y is assumed to have been generated from a normal distribution 
with a mean conditional only on the coefficients β (covariate values in X are considered fixed): 
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f (yi | β, σe) = (2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2)−1/2 * exp� −12𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒2 �𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻𝛃𝛃�2� 
Consistent estimation of the fixed effects parameters would be achieved through maximization of 
the likelihood function, which in every case is the joint distribution of the observed data: 
L(β , σe ; y1, y2, …, yn) = ∏ 𝑓𝑓 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 | 𝜷𝜷,𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒) 𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  
However, as with most longitudinal studies, our data exhibit a “clustered” structure, due 
to measurements taken repeatedly over time for each individual and therefore the typical 
assumption of independent observations required by basic linear regression models is violated. 
While it would be possible to address this problem by introducing n-1 individual-specific 
intercept terms as fixed effects, this approach is problematic in our case due to the large sample 
size n. Furthermore, maximum likelihood estimation of the fixed effects parameters of interest 
would lead to biased variance estimates, due to the fact that the number of nuisance parameters 
(the n-1 individual specific intercept terms) grows proportionally with the sample size.32 
 Linear mixed models (LMM) provide a much more elegant solution to the problem of 
within-subject dependency exhibited by longitudinal data. Instead of treating each subject (i.e. 
cluster-specific) effect as fixed, mixed models assume the cluster-specific effects are a random 
sample from a population distribution. This cluster-specific term, called the random effect or 
heterogeneity, is constant over time for each subject, and is often assumed to have a normal 
distribution with mean 0 and variance σu2. Because our data come from a continuous distribution, 
it may not be unreasonable to assume the following model structure: 
yit = 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻𝜷𝜷 + 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻ui + εit . 
εit ~ N (0, σe2) 
ui ~ N (0, σu2) 
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Where i =1, … n for each subject, and t=1,…ki for each repeated observation on a specific 
subject. The design matrix for the random effect, R, is of dimension m*n, where m is equal to the 
total number of observations and n is the sample size. The addition of the random term allows for 
a separation of within-subject source of variation (σe2) and between-subjects variation (σu2). 
Secondly this specification allows for a more appropriate variance-covariance matrix in which 
observations yit within a subject may be correlated. Within-subject residuals εit are usually 
assumed to be independent, and therefore the variance-covariance matrix of the residuals is still 
represented as diagonal matrix: 
E = Var( ε ) =  
⎝
⎜
⎛
σ𝑒𝑒
200    0σ𝑒𝑒20    00σ𝑒𝑒2 ⋯ 000
⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 0 0 ⋯ σ𝑒𝑒2⎠⎟
⎞
 , 
with dimension m*m. However, now we also have a between-subjects covariance matrix with 
dimension n*n:  
G = Var( u ) =  
⎝
⎜
⎛
σ𝑢𝑢
200    0σ𝑢𝑢20    00σ𝑢𝑢2 ⋯ 000
⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 0 0 ⋯ σ𝑢𝑢2⎠⎟
⎞
 . 
The variance of the vector of outcomes y is therefore: 
Var( y ) = Var( RTu ) + Var( ε ) 
= RT *Var( u )*R + Var( ε ) 
= 
⎝
⎜
⎛
𝑉𝑉100    0𝑉𝑉20    00𝑉𝑉3 ⋯ 000
⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 0 0 ⋯ 𝑉𝑉𝑛𝑛⎠⎟
⎞
 . 
Where Vi is of dimension ki*ki: 
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Vi = 
⎝
⎜
⎛
σ𝑢𝑢
2 + σ𝑒𝑒2
σ𝑢𝑢
2
σ𝑢𝑢
2
   σ𝑢𝑢2σ𝑢𝑢2 + σ𝑒𝑒2
σ𝑢𝑢
2
   σ𝑢𝑢2σ𝑢𝑢2
σ𝑢𝑢
2 + σ𝑒𝑒2 ⋯
σ𝑢𝑢
2
σ𝑢𝑢
2
σ𝑢𝑢
2
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
σ𝑢𝑢
2         σ𝑢𝑢2         σ𝑢𝑢2 ⋯ σ𝑢𝑢2 + σ𝑒𝑒2⎠⎟
⎞
 . 
A third advantage is that mixed models allow available data for each subject to be missing, as in 
our case where data for each beneficiary are unbalanced. That is, each beneficiary is followed 
from their specific year of enrollment until first discontinuation of Part D, and the start and end 
dates are permitted to differ. LMM utilize between-subject information as well as within-subject 
information to compensate for the presence of missing values, and generally give more precise 
estimates than fixed effects models assuming that the missing data are missing at random 
(MAR).  
 The gains that follow from using LMM are accompanied by increased complexity in 
parameter estimation arising from the addition of the random effect. While the random effect is 
useful for accounting for subject-specific variation, we are not interested in interpreting the 
estimated random parameter ui and therefore it is regarded as a nuisance parameter that must be 
dealt with to estimate the parameters of interest, the fixed effects β and the variance parameters. 
We obtain the marginal distribution of the observed data,  f (y| β), by integrating the joint 
distribution f (yi, ui | β, σe, σu) with respect to the random effect:  
f (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖 | 𝜷𝜷, ui) = ∫ 𝑓𝑓 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 | 𝜷𝜷,𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒 ,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢) 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖+∞∞  
The contribution to the marginal likelihood of the ith subject is therefore 
Li (β, σe, σu,; yi,t=1, yi,t=2, …, 𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡=𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖) = ∏ ∫ 𝑓𝑓 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  | 𝜷𝜷,  𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒 ,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢) 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖+∞∞𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=1  
and the likelihood which can be used to obtain maximum likelihood estimates as follows: 
L (β, σe, σu,) = ∏ ∏ ∫ 𝑓𝑓 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖  | 𝜷𝜷,  𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒 ,𝜎𝜎𝑢𝑢) 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖+∞∞𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  
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The problem with maximizing the marginal likelihood is that often the integral cannot be solved 
analytically, necessitating alternative methods of computation. Several solutions have been 
developed, and may be categorized into two types of methods: 1) approximate the integral 
numerically, such as through adaptive quadrature or the Expectation-Maximization (EM) 
method, or 2) approximate the integrand such as through Laplace’s approximation or quasi-
likelihood methods.33 In order to achieve model convergence, Laplace’s approximation was 
specified for the present study. 
 As stated previously, the main objective of our analysis is the consistent and efficient 
estimation of the fixed effects β and the variance covariance matrix Var( y ). The key 
assumptions of the LMM with random effects employed in our analysis are as follows:  
1) Linearity: the relationship between each of the predictors and the mean (or transformed 
mean) outcome is linear. 
2) Homoscedasticity: the variance of the within-subjects error term is constant 
3) Residuals are normally distributed, with mean yi – XiT β and variance σe2. 
4) Compound symmetry: all covariance terms in the covariance matrix are equal, and all 
variance terms are equal (but covariance may be different from variance terms). 
5) Strict exogeneity: the within-subject error terms are not dependent on the values of any 
independent variables for all time-points: 
E[εi | xt1, xt2, …, xtp ] = 0, given i, for all t=1, 2, …, ki. 
6) Random effects ui are independent across subjects, independent of all covariates, and are 
normally distributed with mean 0, variance σu2. 34 
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2.4.2 Healthcare expenditure data and mixture models 
Our analysis involves modelling healthcare expenditure data, specifically gross total and patient 
OOP costs. Although both of these outcomes are continuous, they exhibit some characteristics 
which are known to cause problems with models assuming a normal distribution, as the LMM 
does. First, expenditure data are bounded on the left at 0, often have a long right-hand tail, and 
may be bi-modal. Second, log or square root transformations are often not normalizing for these 
data due to the frequently high counts of individuals with expenditures of $0 exhibited by non-
users.35 These qualities have led to the development of novel approaches for data of this type, 
research which is largely represented in the cost-effectiveness and health econometrics literature. 
A recent review of these methods has noted the lack of a gold-standard approach that provides 
unbiased and efficient estimates. 36 
One class of models that has shown promising results for data with excess zeros is the 
‘two-part’ models. These models are mixed-distribution (i.e. mixture) models designed to 
analyze the data in two parts: a degenerate component (the occurrence of zero) and a continuous 
component with a support set with an open boundary at 0 to positive infinity. These two 
components are fit to separate models and estimated separately, an approach which has been 
shown to perform better than single-equation models. 37 
One such two-part model design which has been tailored to applications with clustered 
data, and which has been adopted for the present study, was developed and evaluated by Tooze 
et al. 38 In general, we can express a mixture model for a random variable Y as follows: 
f (y) = �
Pr(𝑌𝑌 = 0) ,[1 − Pr(𝑌𝑌 = 0)]ℎ(𝑦𝑦)0              if 𝑦𝑦 = 0if 𝑦𝑦 > 0if 𝑦𝑦 < 0 
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where h(y) is the probability density for values of y > 0. Applying this to our data, we can define 
a variable Zit to represent whether or not an observed outcome Yit from individual i at time t is 
equal to 0: 
Zit = �
0 if 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 = 01 if 𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 > 0 
We model the relationship between this outcome and the covariates separately from the values of 
Yit  > 0. Because Zit is a binary outcome, we must take advantage of the class of generalized 
linear mixed models (GLMM) which models the mean of a binary random variable (such as Zit), 
with range between 0 and 1, using the logit transformation. We therefore model the probability 
that Zit is equal to 0 (or in our case we model probability of non-zero) using a logistic model with 
random effects: 
logit[ P(Zit = 1) ] = ln �
P(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=1)
1− P(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=1)� = 𝑿𝑿𝑻𝑻 𝜷𝜷𝒁𝒁 + 𝑹𝑹𝑻𝑻 uZi 
usi ~ N (0, σ12) 
 
Let βZ denote the vector of fixed effects parameters βZ ={αZ, βZ1, βZ2, …, βZp}’ specific to the 
logistic model; αZ is the common intercept and subscript p is the number of fixed effects; X 
denotes the design matrix of dimension n*(p+1), containing the data for covariates for each 
observation, and uZi is the random effect specific to the logistic model of Zit. Using the 
nomenclature from Tooze et al., we refer to this as the occurrence variable. By solving for the 
probability of observing Zit = 1 we can obtain the expression 
P(Zit = 1| βZ) = exp( 𝑿𝑿𝑻𝑻 𝜷𝜷𝒁𝒁 + 𝑹𝑹𝑻𝑻 uZi )/( 1+exp(𝑿𝑿𝑻𝑻 𝜷𝜷𝒁𝒁 + 𝑹𝑹𝑻𝑻 uZi) ) , 
 As mentioned above, we also model separately the individuals with values of the outcomes for 
which Yit  > 0 is true. Define this random variable Sit = [ Yit | Zit = 1] to be the intensity variable, 
 21 
again following the example of Tooze et al. For this we assume a classic LMM structure with 
normally distributed random error: 
sit = 𝑿𝑿𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻𝜷𝜷𝑺𝑺 + 𝑹𝑹𝒊𝒊𝑻𝑻uSi + εit . 
εit ~ N (0, σe2) 
usi ~ N (0, σ22) 
Note here that the parameters βS are specific to the model of Sit, as is the random error term uSi. 
Define θZ = { βZ , uZi } to be the set of parameters specific to the logistic component of the 
mixture model, and similarly θS = { βS , uis } are the set of parameters specific to the model of the 
intensity variable. We can now combine these two components in order to define the probability 
density function of all values of Yit as follows: 
f (yit | θZ, θS ) = P(Zit = 0 | θZ)*I[Zit = 0] + P(Zit = 1 | θZ)* f (sit | θS ) , 
where I[Zit = 0] is the indicator function and is equal to 1 when the argument is true and 0 when 
it is false; let f (sit | θS ) be the probability density function for random variable Sit conditional on 
intensity variable model-specific parameter values θS. We can obtain estimates for θZ and θS by 
maximizing a likelihood function. As before, the random effects have a distribution which must 
be taken into account in the likelihood. However, because we have two random effects, one from 
each model component, we assume the random effects are jointly bivariate normally distributed: 
 
f (uZi, uSi; σ1 , σ2 ) = �2𝜋𝜋𝜎𝜎1𝜎𝜎2�1 − 𝜌𝜌2�−1 * exp� −12�1−𝜌𝜌2 ��𝑢𝑢𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎1 �2 − 2𝜌𝜌 �𝑢𝑢𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎1 � �𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎2 � +  �𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝜎𝜎2 �2�� 
 
where σ12 is the variance of uZi and σ22 is the variance of uSi. As with the linear models case, we 
are interested in maximizing the marginal likelihood function obtained by integrating each 
observation’s contribution to the likelihood with respect to both random variables: 
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L (βZ, βS, σe, σ1, σ2) = ∏ ∏ ∫ ∫ 𝑓𝑓 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖,𝑢𝑢𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ,𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  | 𝜷𝜷𝒁𝒁,   𝜷𝜷𝑺𝑺,𝜎𝜎𝑒𝑒 ,𝜎𝜎1,𝜎𝜎2) 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  
= ∏ ∏ ∫ ∫ 𝑓𝑓 (𝑦𝑦𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 | 𝜽𝜽𝒁𝒁,𝜽𝜽𝑺𝑺 )𝑓𝑓 ( 𝑢𝑢𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 ,𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖  | 𝜷𝜷𝒁𝒁,𝜎𝜎1,𝜎𝜎2) 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑢𝑢𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡=1𝑛𝑛𝑖𝑖=1  
Note that if we assume the random effects are independent, this function could be factored into 
two parts representing the marginal likelihoods of the logistic and normal components. In other 
words, maximizing the likelihood functions of each model separately will yield MLE’s for the 
mixture model if we assume ρ = 0. However, the model developed by Tooze allows for 
estimation of correlated random effects using PROC NLMIXED in SAS. 38 
2.4.3 Study design, model fitting and evaluation 
All statistical analysis and data management was performed using SAS version 9.4. Using the 
total sample obtained after applying exclusion criteria (N=1,187,469), descriptive statistics were 
calculated, including frequencies and percentages as well as group means and standard 
deviations. Due to the complexity of the random effect models and the size of the total sample, a 
1.5% random sample (N=17,812) of the beneficiaries from the total sample was used for analysis 
using mixed models, referred to henceforth as the analytical sample. The size of this sample was 
determined through trial and error, and is approximately the largest sample that would lead to 
convergence of the models of interest. 
In order to understand the effect of plan switching on costs in the year after the switch 
occurred, two types of models were fit and compared for each outcome. First, a LMM was fit for 
each outcome, including an individual random effect and adjusting for covariates. The empirical 
distributions of each outcome were examined using histograms and transformations were applied 
if necessary in order to obtain approximate normality of the outcomes. Second, a mixture model 
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consisting of logistic and lognormal components, and allowing for correlated random effects 
(section 2.5.2), was applied wherever possible using the SAS macro MIXCORR written by and 
obtained from Tooze et al.38 The MIXCORR macro operates by first defining the occurrence and 
intensity variables. These variables are then modeled separately in regression models without 
random effects using PROC GENMOD and specifying the appropriate distribution (e.g. binomial 
for occurrence and lognormal for intensity). The estimates produced from PROC GENMOD are 
then used as starting values in the fully-specified correlated random effects mixture model fit 
using PROC NLMIXED. While MIXCORR also fits an uncorrelated random effects mixture 
model (assuming random effects from the logistic and lognormal components are independent), 
we focus on the results from the correlated model. Laplace approximation was specified for all 
mixtures models using the QPOINTS=1 option in PROC NLMIXED. LMM models were fit 
using a procedure that mimicked MIXCORR; a fixed effects model was fit using PROC 
GENMOD and the estimates were used as starting values in a random effects model fit using 
PROC NLMIXED and Laplace approximation. 
The fit of LMM and mixture models was evaluated and compared by assessing the 
normality of random effects in Q-Q-plots and histograms. In addition, scatter plots of residuals 
(fixed + random effects) from each model were generated and compared. Point estimates and 
standard deviations for fixed effects were also compared for each model. All models evaluated 
the effect of each type of plan switching controlling for covariates. Parameter estimates were 
considered statistically significantly different from 0 when p<0.05. The overall contribution of 
switching to each model was evaluated, and if statistically significant, pairwise differences 
between each combination of switching category were evaluated using CONTRAST statements.  
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Unless otherwise noted, all models adjusted for all covariates. Time independent 
covariates included gender, race, age at baseline, plan type (whether the beneficiary stayed 
enrolled in PDP plans, MA-PD plans, or switched between PDP and MA-PD plans) and total 
number of active plan switches (defined as sum of PT-S, PC-S, PR-S, as well as any mid-year 
switches). Models also adjusted for region of residence at baseline, where beneficiaries were 
included into one of 5 state groupings (Table 2), each consisting of two or more PDP or MA-PD 
regions. These groupings were created in order to reduce the number of dummy variables needed 
to adjust for geographic location model, as the 34 PDP regions and 26 MA-PD regions do not 
correspond 1:1 and were too numerous to include without aggregating. Baseline levels of the 
outcome were also included, defined as the outcome value observed during the first year of 
enrollment in a Part D plan.  Models also adjusted for time-varying calendar year and total 
number of CCW chronic conditions. Baseline levels of the outcome, total number of plan 
switches and total number of CCW chronic conditions were square-root transformed and 
standardized in order to avoid model convergence errors associated with large scaling differences 
between covariates.  
2.5 DATA MANAGEMENT 
2.5.1 Datasets 
The CMS Chronic Conditions Data Warehouse (CCW) provided annual data from a random 5% 
sample of all Medicare beneficiaries. Data were distributed across several different files, 
including dedicated files for enrollment information, Part D drug events, Part D plan 
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characteristics, Part D premiums, etc. All datasets were de-identified, but CCW provided unique 
beneficiary link keys (“bene id”) in order to facilitate merging information from the same 
beneficiary across files within a year as well as between years. 
The current study utilized files containing data from years 2006 to 2012. During this 
timeframe CCW changed the organization and conventions of several datasets, a shift that did 
not involve changes to the data collected but did impose additional data management issues. 
Prior to 2010, some beneficiary-level information such as enrollment, eligibility, vital statistics, 
summarized service utilization and payment, and chronic condition flags were specifically 
located in the Beneficiary Annual Summary File (BASF), while other enrollment and entitlement 
variables were located in a Master Beneficiary Summary File (MBSF). From 2010 forward, the 
MBSF was split into several separate files, each containing specific information such as 
Medicare Part A/B/D enrollment and entitlement information, chronic conditions, cost and 
utilization and national death index (NDI), for vital statistics. In addition, starting in 2010 these 
separate MBSF files incorporated the variables formerly contained in the BASF, which was 
discontinued.  
Data reorganization particularly affected the location of beneficiary demographics, 
enrollment and entitlement information. The change of file location of key 
enrollment/demographic information by year is shown in Table 3. The current study utilized 
enrollment and demographic data from the BASF and MBSF files for years 2006 to 2009, while 
for years 2010 to 2012 the MBSF files corresponding to Medicare Parts A, B and D were used. 
These files included many key variables used in determining study eligibility: monthly 
categorizations of enrollment in Parts A, B and D, as well as eligibility or receipt of LIS; total 
months of state buy-in; and monthly Part D plan contract ID. They also contained gender, age, 
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race and state code variables. Comorbidity data was included in the general MBSF file until 
2009, but after 2010 was located in a dedicated MBSF Chronic Conditions segment. The 
presence of common and chronic conditions is captured by 27 CCW Chronic Conditions 
variables, using claims-based algorithms as a proxy for evidence of the presence of a condition.  
Finally, each year Part D plan contracts between plan sponsors and CMS are reevaluated, 
and may lead to plan terminations, consolidations or plan splitting. These outcomes are recorded 
for all Part D plans in the plan crosswalk files, which were in turn used to determine plan 
switching status for each beneficiary from December to January. 
 
2.5.2 Constructing the research sample 
Application of the exclusion criteria was performed during assembly of the research sample 
using SAS. Before combining the annual datasets, some beneficiaries were removed based on 
logical extensions of the exclusion criteria. For example, beneficiaries not enrolled in a Part D 
plan in December of 2006 necessarily met at least one exclusion criterion and were removed. 
Similarly, individuals who were not enrolled in a Part D plan in both January and December of 
the same given year were excluded from that annual dataset. This process minimized the size of 
the annual datasets in order to reduce the amount of processing time needed for the merge 
operation. 
Once the initial pruning process was completed, the annual datasets were merged by 
beneficiary ID. At this stage a string variable was created consisting of a single character for 
each month of the maximum 84 months of enrollment through the 7 years of the study, similar to 
the 84-character strings in Figure 1. The character code and its position in the 84-character string 
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were used to identify whether a beneficiary was “enrolled” or “not enrolled” in a Part D plan for 
each month of the 7-year study period. If a beneficiary was identified as having discontinued 
their Part D enrollment during the 84 months, all months following first discontinuation were 
identified as “not enrolled,” (see section 2.1.1 above). Using this generated string variable, 
exclusion criteria were applied. LIS status was determined using cost share group information 
recorded monthly. Beneficiaries were removed if deemed eligible for any amount of LIS subsidy 
or if their total months of state buy-in exceeded 0 months. Any individual who was not enrolled 
in a Part D plan for at least one continuous Dec-Jan transition period was also removed.  
2.5.3 Plan switching 
Plan switching types were assigned using the plan crosswalk files for each year as well as the 
beneficiary’s plan IDs for the two months of each Dec-Jan transition period. Enrollment datasets 
included encrypted Part D plan IDs for each month of the year. The plan cross-walk file for a 
given year contained encrypted plan IDs from that year, as well as the corresponding ID or IDs 
the plan was mapped to the following year (see Figure 2, Panel A for an example). In addition, 
the crosswalk file contained a relationship code communicating whether the plan was terminated 
(in which case there would be no corresponding ID the following year), consolidated (many 
plans would have the same ID the following year), split (a single plan would have many 
corresponding IDs the following year), or renewed (same unique ID the following year). Figure 
2, Panel B contains a step-by-step schematic example illustrating how plan switching group was 
determined for example data from transition period 2007 to 2008. Each beneficiary’s plan ID 
from December of a given year (e.g. 2007 in the example) was merged with the ID for the plan 
in the crosswalk file corresponding to the same year (e.g. 2007). Next, the beneficiary’s plan ID 
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from January of the following year (e.g. 2008) was merged with the corresponding ID from the 
crosswalk file. Switching types were assigned by comparing the actual January plan ID from the 
second year in the pair (e.g. 2008) to the plan ID in the crosswalk file as well as the relationship 
code. In the example in Figure 2, beneficiary 1 was assigned PR-NS because the beneficiary’s 
plan from year 2008 matched the plan ID from the crosswalk file for year 2008 and the 
relationship code indicated that the plan had been renewed. Beneficiary 2 was assigned PC-NS 
was assigned because actual plan ID for 2008 matched the cross-walked 2008 ID for a 
consolidated plan. Finally, beneficiary 3 was assigned PC-S because plan ID’s did not match, 
and the plan was consolidated. 
A beneficiary continuously enrolled in Part D for Y years would have participated in at 
most Y-1 Dec-Jan transition periods. Therefore, for modelling purposes, plan switching 
classifications were associated with spending outcomes from the year following the transition 
period. Outcomes from the first year of a beneficiary’s enrollment were not associated with any 
plan switching group and were treated baseline levels of spending. 
2.5.4 Outcomes 
Total gross costs and patient OOP spending were calculated as the average monthly dollars 
for a given year. Both of these outcomes were obtained from the Part D Event (PDE) data file. 
The PDE file contains a separate record each time a beneficiary made a prescription drug 
purchase. Outcome calculations only incorporated costs that were recorded before a beneficiary’s 
first discontinuation from the Part D program (see Section 2.1.1 above). For each year, the sum 
of these costs was divided by the number of months the beneficiary was enrolled in any 
plan; therefore, no distinction was made between costs accrued while enrolled in different 
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plans for those beneficiaries who switched plans mid-year. For example, individuals 
switching plans in April may have paid more from January to March compared with April to 
December, but the calculated outcomes would reflect the average spending for any month. 
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3.0  RESULTS 
3.1 TOTAL SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS 
Characteristics of the total sample are displayed in Table 4. In general terms, the sample was 
majority female and non-Hispanic white, and enrolled exclusively in PDP plans. On average 
beneficiaries were about 72 years, with approximately 2 CCW conditions. Although a smaller 
proportion of the sample was enrolled in a Part D plan during the early years, the average 
number of years followed in the sample was about 5.2 years out of 7. The analytical sample was 
similar in all characteristics. 
 Table 5 shows the empirical distribution of plan switching counts across all years. While 
94.8% of the sample had not experienced any plan terminations, plan consolidations affected a 
slight majority of the sample at least one time. Out of the total sample, less than 10% switched at 
least once following plan consolidation, but more than 20% switched following plan renewal at 
least once. Overall, 35.9% of the sample had ever switched at least once during the Dec-Jan 
transition period, 15.2% had ever switched outside the Dec-Jan transition period, and 45% had 
ever switched plans at least once. About 19.6% of the sample had switched plans two or more 
times during the study period. 
 Figure 3 displays the proportion of beneficiaries in each switching category, by Dec-Jan 
transition period. In each period the largest proportion of the sample was PR-NS. The 2007-2008 
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period saw the largest proportion of PR-S, while the 2010-2011 period saw the largest 
proportions of PT-S, PC-NS, and PC-S among the periods observed. 
 Tables 6 and 7 show descriptive statistics for gross spending and patient OOP, 
respectively. The proportion of zero values was substantial for each outcome and increased with 
calendar year. Gross cost means increased from 2006-2009 and then decreased, while patient 
OOP costs appeared relatively consistent from 2006 to 2010, after which they decreased 
markedly. Consistent with a right skewed distribution, means exceeded medians for each year, 
and maxima were several orders of magnitude larger than medians. Furthermore, the 99th 
percentiles in some cases were at least an order of magnitude lower than the maximum for each 
year. In general, gross spending was 2-3 times larger than patient OOP costs on average. 
3.2 PLAN SWITCHING AND GROSS COST 
Figure 4 displays the histograms of untransformed and transformed gross cost. In its original 
form, the distribution of gross cost is highly skewed, with a large peak at 0 and a very long right 
tail (panel A). Although the distribution is much closer to normal after log transforming gross 
cost (after adding 1 unit, panel B), the log transformation of just the non-zero values used in the 
lognormal component of the mixture model produces a distribution even closer to normal (panel 
C). 
 Due to the relatively normalizing effect of the log transformation on gross cost, 
modelling with LMM proceeded using a log transformation (after adding 1 unit), and included 
all covariates. Model diagnostics in Figure 5 show that estimated random effects are 
approximately normal except at the tails, with the lower tail leading to largest violations of the 
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normality assumption (panels A1 and A2). Residuals were highly heteroscedastic, again 
corresponding with lower values of gross cost (panel B2). However, a histogram of the residuals 
suggests approximate normality. 
 Model convergence was achieved with the mixture model, but not when baseline gross 
cost was included as a covariate. Diagnostic plots of the model fit after removing baseline gross 
cost are shown in Figure 6. Compared to random effects from the LMM, the Q-Q plot of the 
random effects from the lognormal component of the mixture model do not exhibit any regions 
of egregious departure from the normal line, and the histogram also shows a closer fit to the 
normal curve (panels B1 and B2). Residual plots show an even distribution around 0 without the 
structure observed in the LMM model, and normality appears not to be violated (panels C1 and 
C2). However, the random effects estimated from the logistic component display a bimodal 
distribution with marked departures from normality (panel A1 and A2). 
 Table 8 shows unadjusted means of gross cost increasing after the enrollment period for 
all switching groups. Estimated coefficients, 95% confidence intervals and p-values from both 
the mixture models and LMM are displayed in Tables 9 and 10, respectively, while and a 
schematic summary of significant differences is shown in Figure 7. Plan switching variables 
added significantly to the model fit overall (not shown) when using the LMM structure 
(p<0.001) as well as the mixture model (logistic: p=0.011; lognormal: p=0.002). In general, the 
lognormal component estimated the highest gross costs in the PR-NS group, and the lowest costs 
in the PC-S group. This was substantiated by significant pairwise differences showing gross 
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costs among PR-NS were 6.6% higher compared to PC-S and 2.2% higher compared to PC-NS 1. 
In addition, the lowest cost group, PC-S, had significantly lower costs compared to PC-NS and 
PR-S. On the other hand, results from the logistic component show that the PT-S group was 
associated with the highest likelihood that patient OOP costs would be greater than $0 in the year 
after a given enrollment period. This probability was 102.0% higher than the PC-NS group 
(p=0.027) and also 102.4% higher than the PC-S group (p=0.022). Finally, the PR-NS group had 
a 32.9% greater likelihood of positive gross cost compared to the PC-NS group (p=0.002). 
Estimates from the LMM model echoed those from the mixture model, with PR-NS and PC-S 
exhibiting the highest and lowest gross costs, respectively. PR-NS was significantly higher 
compared to PC-S (5.9%, p=0.007) and PC-NS (3.6%, p<0.001). 
Greater number of total switching events was associated with significantly greater gross 
costs in the LMM model (p<.001); however the mixture model suggest that more frequent 
switchers are at higher risk of gross costs exceeding $0 (logistic p<.001) but not necessarily 
higher costs among users (lognormal p=0.8891).  
3.3 PLAN SWITCHING AND PATIENT OOP COST 
Histograms of the untransformed and transformed patient OOP costs are shown in Figure 8. 
Patient OOP costs displayed a distribution with a long right tail, with a mode somewhat larger 
                                                 
1 Here and elsewhere in the Results section, reported percent differences for a given pairwise comparison represent 
the ratio of the two estimated parameters (reported in the corresponding table). The greater of the two estimated 
parameters is always divided by the smaller.  
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than $0 (panel A). Applying the log transformation was approximately normalizing (panel B), 
especially when ignoring values of 0 (panel C).  
Figures 9 and 10 display diagnostic plots for the LMM and mixture models of patient 
OOP cost, respectively. All covariates were included in both models. LMM random effects are 
approximately normal except for the lower tail (panels A1 and A2). Residuals are also 
approximately normal, while residuals suggest marked heteroscedasticity (panels B1 and B2). 
Random effects from the logistic component of the mixture model also display a 
departure from normality, again exacerbated at the lower tail (panels A1 and A2). However, the 
normal model seems to be a good fit for the lognormal random effects (panels B1 and B2) and 
residuals (panel C2), while residuals appear relatively homoscedastic compared to the LMM 
(panel C1). 
 Unadjusted means of patient OOP in Table 11 show slight decreases post-switching for 
all groups except PR-NS. Estimated coefficients and 95% confidence intervals from models of 
patient out of pocket spending are shown in Table 12 and 13 for mixture model and LMM, 
respectively. The schematic summary of significant results in Figure 7 also includes patient OOP 
models (lower half). Plan switching variables added significantly to the model fit overall (not 
shown) when using the LMM structure (p<0.001) as well as the mixture model (logistic: 
p<0.001; lognormal: p<0.001). Results from the lognormal component show the highest patient 
OOP costs among the PR-NS and PC-NS groups, and the lowest patient OOP costs among the 
PR-S and PC-S groups. As shown by the mixture model (lognormal component), the PR-NS 
group had 7.5% higher costs in the year following a given Dec-Jan transition period compared to 
PR-S (p<0.001), and 4.8% higher costs compared to PC-S (p<0.001); PC-NS also had 6.2% 
higher costs compared to PR-S (p=0.020). Results from the logistic model component indicated 
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that the PT-S group was associated with the highest likelihood that patient OOP costs would be 
greater than 0$ following a given Dec-Jan transition period. This probability was 77.9% higher 
than the PC-NS group (p=0.027) and 62.9% higher than the PC-S group (p=0.022). PR-NS also 
had a 19.7% higher probability of costs being greater than $0 compared to the PC-NS group. 
 Results from the LMM corroborated results from the mixture model, suggesting that in 
general, the PR-NS group incurred the greatest patient OOP costs, and the PR-S group incurred 
the lowest: costs among the PR-NS group were 8.2% higher than PC-S (p<0.001), 5.1% higher 
than PR-S (p=0.016), and 2.8% higher than PC-NS (p=0.003). On the other hand, PR-S costs 
were and 5.2% lower than PC-NS (p<0.001). 
 Finally, more switching events was associated with a higher likelihood of patient OOP 
greater than $0 in the logistic portion of the mixture model (p<0.001), but the estimate was not 
significant in the lognormal component (p=0.059). The LMM estimated a significantly higher 
patient OOP cost as total number of switches increased (p<0.001). 
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4.0  DISCUSSION 
Every year during the open enrollment period, Medicare Part D beneficiaries are faced with 
choosing among a large number of prescription drug plans with a complex array of plan 
attributes. Although remaining in the same plan as the previous year is a possibility if it is 
renewed by the sponsor, beneficiaries may also be subject to unanticipated changes that might 
affect the quality of their decisions. It is also not clear to what extent differences in plan 
expenditures depend on switching plans. The current study presents results from a longitudinal 
analysis of non-LIS Part D enrollees observed between 2006 and 2012 and who participated in at 
least one Dec-Jan transition period.  
Using random effects models to control for between-subject variability, we sought to 
identify whether unanticipated plan changes led to higher expenditures, and whether switching 
led to lower expenditure outcomes in the year directly following the Dec-Jan transition period. 
Model diagnostics indicated that mixture models in general provided a better fit for the data 
compared to LMM, but estimates still largely concurred. As shown in the lower half of Figure 7, 
results indicate that patient OOP costs increased the most among non-switchers (PC-NS and PR-
NS groups), but only by a margin of up to 7.5% compared to other groups. Plan terminations did 
not lead to significantly higher spending among users, but did increase the likelihood of non-zero 
expenditures by up to 77.9% compared to other switching groups. Finally, plan consolidations 
did not lead to significantly different patient OOP compared to plan renewals, although the PC-S 
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group led to lower gross total spending compared to other plan consolidation and renewal 
groups, including PR-S. 
Our results showing significantly higher patient OOP costs among non-switchers is 
consistent with reports of average increases in costs since 2006—especially premiums—among 
plans with high enrollment.14 Individuals who do not re-evaluate the appropriateness of their 
current plan based on the information provided to them by CMS may be more likely to remain in 
their current plans and incur higher OOP costs compared to those who switch. This result is also 
consistent with previous reports suggesting that reductions in overspending may be attributable 
to switching plans.18,28 However, our results indicate that patient OOP spending is only between 
4.8 and 7.5% higher among non-switchers compared to switchers. Because mean patient OOP 
spending was about $45 to $59 in a given year, this translates into savings of roughly $2 to $5 
per month (or $24 to $60 per year) in savings among switchers compared to non-switchers. This 
is almost an order of magnitude lower than the potential savings among non-LIS beneficiaries 
who choose the best plans, which is reported to be between $200 and $368 on average 
annually.21,18 Our results indicate that while some individuals may be cutting their over spending 
by switching more than others, the average beneficiary was saving 6- 8 times less than they 
could have been. This reinforces the notion that the Medicare population is not choosing the 
lowest cost plans, even among individuals who find reason to actively re-evaluate their plan 
enrollment by switching. 
Although plan terminations and consolidations may have been unanticipated, and in the 
case of terminations may have led to a “forced” switch, contrary to our hypothesis these events 
did not have a detectable negative effect on gross spending or patient OOP costs. While a 
possible explanation may have been a relatively low frequency of occurrence of this type of 
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switching, raw means of patient OOP spending pre- and post-PT-S do not suggest any large 
differences. Results showing higher probability of non-zero spending among the PT-S group 
may be driven by switching events during the 2010-2011 enrollment period. This period featured 
the largest proportion of plan terminations among the years considered, at 3.4%, and also 
corresponds with the 3rd year since CMS began issuing plan ratings and requiring that plans with 
poor ratings cease to be offered. It is possible that plans with poor ratings did not provide 
beneficiaries with needed services or coverage, and that following termination, spending may 
have increased due to new plans facilitating needed prescription drug use. 
Our descriptive analysis of the study sample showed that a considerable number of 
individuals experienced plan consolidations or splitting each year, especially during the 2009-
2010 and 2010-2011 enrollment periods. This coincides with the introduction of the CMS policy 
requiring sponsors to eliminate redundancy and unnecessary plan choices. Interestingly, patient 
OOP also showed relatively large decreases after 2010, perhaps an indirect effect of the same 
policy. Other firm mergers and acquisitions may have also contributed to the disproportionately 
high number of consolidations during these two periods.20 Our results indicate that plan 
consolidations, despite being potentially unanticipated, did not lead to detectably poorer plan 
choices by way of higher OOP spending. Interestingly, however, the largest decreases in gross 
spending corresponded with the PC-S group, among which gross spending was 5% lower than 
PR-S for a given year. Future studies may find reason to investigate this finding more closely 
using models adjusting for baseline levels of gross spending, which we could not do using the 
chosen modelling method. 
 The current study as it was carried out has some notable strengths and weaknesses. The 
use of mixture models to address the zero-inflated expenditure data seems to have provided a 
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much better fit compared to LMM, at least in the lognormal components, facilitating confident 
interpretation of the estimates. Random effects from the logistic components, however, have 
bimodal distributions, making the normality assumption dubious. Future iterations of this 
analysis would do well to consider alternative model specifications. Models of gross spending 
for the current study also failed to converge when baseline spending was included as a covariate, 
or when geographic location was accounted for using the 34 PDP or 26 MAPD regions. 
Furthermore, the timeframe studied largely encompasses the 2008 economic depression as well 
as the introduction of specific CMS policies such as the requirement to limit duplicate plans in 
2011. Therefore these results may not be fully generalizable to years beyond 2012. 
In summary, the current study reports results from random effects mixture models used to 
evaluate the effects of plan switching types on Part D gross spending and patient OOP costs, and 
controlling for time and other covariates. Our results suggest that plan consolidation and plan 
termination do not appear to be leading to increased beneficiary spending or a resulting negative 
impact on public health in general. Therefore we have not found evidence to suggest that the 
policies which enable consolidations and terminations as they are implemented now are in need 
of revision. Our results also indicate that while switching plans does lead to lower OOP costs, the 
relative effects of switching are low compared to the potential savings reported by other studies. 
The public health significance of this study is that individuals incur greater costs if they do not 
switch plans, and may increase the chances of health-related consequences due to higher 
costs.6,7,8,9,10,11 However, even among those individuals who do switch plans, the average OOP 
cost reduction is only a fraction of what it could be according to previous studies.21,28 The CMS 
should perhaps implement more policies or tools for beneficiaries to more easily identify 
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compatible, minimally costly plans during open enrollment period, for example using an 
intelligent-decision algorithm such as that suggested by Zhang et al. 30 
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APPENDIX: TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Each line represents a hypothetical beneficiary’s status in the Part D program through the 7 years 
of the study, where each of the 82 months are represented by either an “O” or “X” character. The 
“O” characters signify that the beneficiary was not enrolled in a Part D plan that month, while 
the “X” characters indicate enrollment. Red boxes correspond to Dec-Jan transition periods at 
which plan switching group could be assigned.  
 
Figure 1. Diagram of longitudinal Part D plan enrollment data for 3 hypothetical 
beneficiaries.  
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Figure 2. Example crosswalk file and schematic of the process used for determining plan 
switching group status.  
 
 
  
A. Example crosswalk file linking 2007 to 2008 plans  
1. Merge 2007 beneficiary data to plan crosswalk file based on Dec 2007 plan ID 
2. Merge resulting file to 2008 beneficiary data based on beneficiary ID 
B. Determining plan switching status for the 2007-2008 transition period 
3. Compare plan relationship code, plan IDs for 2008 (red box above), to obtain plan 
switching status 
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Table 1. Sample size before and after applying exclusion criteria. 
  
Restriction / year N 
No restriction: all individuals  
2006 2,526,596 
2007 2,570,615 
2008 2,622,588 
2009 2,668,398 
2010 2,727,742 
2011 2,802,032 
2012 2,891,669 
  
Enrolled in Part D through at least one enrollment period 2,034,326 
Enrolled in Part D through at least one enrollment period and never 
LIS 
1,187,469* 
*Final total sample size 
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Table 2. Definition of each of the 5 state groupings used to control for geographic location. 
Group  States/territories included 
1 NH, ME, CT, MA, RI, VT, NY, NJ, DE, DC, MD, PA, WV 
2 NC, VA, GA, SC, FL, AL, TN, LA, MS 
3 MI, OH, IN, KY, IL, WI, IA, MN, MP, NE, ND, SD, WY 
4 CO, NM, AZ, NV, CA, ID, OR, UT, WA 
5 HI, AK, Other territories 
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Table 3. File location of key enrollment/demographic data before and after 2010. 
Data type File location 2006-2009 File location 2010-2012 
Chronic Condition Indicators BASF MBSF (Chronic conditions) 
LIS status Part D Denominator File MBSF (Part D) 
Part D plan ID’s (monthly) Part D Denominator File MBSF (Part D) 
Race Part D Denominator File MBSF (Base) 
Sex and Age MBSF MBSF (Base) 
State Buy-In status MBSF MBSF (Base) 
State code MBSF MBSF (Base) 
Beneficiary Annual Summary File, BASF; Master Beneficiary Summary File, MBSF; Low-
Income Subsidy (LIS) 
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Table 4. Characteristics of the total study sample as well as analytical sample used for 
modelling.  
Variable (cell contents) Total Sample 
N=1,187,469 
 Analytical Sample 
N=17,812 
Female (%) 60.2  60.3 
Race (%)    
    Unknown 3.2  3.5 
    Non-Hispanic White 82.5  82.0 
    Black or African American 5.1  5.2 
    Other 1.2  1.3 
    Asian/Pacific Islander 1.8  1.7 
    Hispanic 6.1  6.1 
    American Indian/Alaska 0.2  0.2 
Age at baseline (mean/SD) 72.1 (8.9)  72.2 (8.9) 
# of years in sample (mean/SD) 5.2 (1.9)  5.2 (1.9) 
% of total sample in each year    
    2006 58.3  58.8 
    2007 67.0  67.3 
    2008 71.7  72.1 
    2009 75.5  75.6 
    2010 78.4  78.7 
    2011 84.0  84.3 
    2012 80.3  80.3 
Maximum CCW conditions (mean/SD) 2.1 (2.2)  1.9 (2.1) 
Plan type (%)    
    PDP only 51.5  50.5 
    MA-PD only 34.9  34.9 
    Regional PPO 1.0  1.0 
    Employer-sponsored 0.3  0.3 
    Non-continuous 12.2  13.3 
Standard deviation, SD; Part D Plan, PDP; Medicare Advantage Part D, MA-PD; Preferred Provider 
Organization; PPO 
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Table 5. Distribution of plan switching counts per person between 2006 and 2012, as a 
percent of total sample. 
 Frequency per person (% of total sample) 
 0 1 2 3 >3 
Plan Termination--Switch 94.8 4.8 0.3 0.0 0.0 
Plan consolidation      
    No Switch 52.1 33.4 12.7 1.8 0.1 
    Switch 90.3 8.8 0.8 0.0 0.0 
    Total 46.0 35.9 15.3 2.6 0.2 
Plan Renewal      
    No Switch 4.7 20.4 15.9 17.2 42.0 
    Switch 72.0 20.4 5.5 1.6 0.5 
      
Total end-of-year switch*  64.1 23.3 8.5 2.9 0.3 
Total mid-year switch** 81.3 14.8 2.8 0.7 0.4 
Total switch*** 54.0 26.4 11.6 4.9 3.1 
*Sum of plan termination—switch, plan consolidation—switch, plan renewal—switch. 
**Plan switches initiated outside of the annual enrollment period 
***Sum of end-of-year and mid-year switches 
 
  
48 
 
Plan renewal—no switch, PR-NS; plan renewal—no switch, PR-S; plan consolidation--switch, 
PC-S; plan consolidation—no switch, PC-NS; plan termination--switch, PT-S. 
 
Figure 3. Percent of beneficiaries in each switching category by transition period. 
 
49 
Table 6. Descriptive statistics for gross cost (average dollars per month) by year. 
 Year 
Statistic* 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
% Zero 8.3 7.3 7.9 8.6 10.4 11.3 11.1 
        
Mean* 143.2 154.7 155.6 157.7 154.7 156.9 154.4 
SD 184.7 216.8 238.3 263.3 288.3 324.0 370.3 
        
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
P25 32.5 35.8 32.7 28.7 22.7 19.2 18.2 
Median 100.5 107.6 104.2 101.3 92.0 82.2 73.2 
P75 197.1 207.8 209.4 215.4 211.8 208.2 194.8 
P99 740.4 831.5 883.1 922.6 948.4 1023.3 1077.7 
Maximum 9831.8 13476.7 16410.7 20819.2 41071.2 69385.5 53556.1 
*All statistics were calculated on the total sample including zero values. 
Standard deviation, SD; 25th percentile, P25; 75th percentile, P75; 99th percentile, P99 
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Table 7. Descriptive statistics for monthly patient OOP (average dollars per month) by 
year. 
Year 
Statistic* 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
% Zero 11.0 12.6 13.6 14.6 15.4 16.7 16.1 
Mean* 55.4 58.5 55.8 56.3 55.8 47.2 44.9 
SD 68.8 75.6 78.2 80.7 82.5 61.0 60.8 
Minimum 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
P25 11.3 11.9 10.0 9.3 8.5 7.4 6.8 
Median 35.6 35.1 31.7 31.8 30.7 28.2 26.1 
P75 68.9 69.5 64.6 65.8 65.2 61.7 57.5 
P99 321.9 338.4 355.9 379.4 395.9 270.9 276.4 
Maximum 2447.2 3017.3 4730.9 4922.3 4595.7 3671.2 2845.2 
*All statistics were calculated on the total sample including zero values.
Standard deviation, SD; 25th percentile, P25; 75th percentile, P75; 99th percentile, P99 
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Untransformed gross cost (A); log transformed gross cost + 1 modelled in the LMM (B); and log 
of non-zero values of gross cost modelled by the mixture model (C). 
Figure 4. Histograms with normal curves showing the distribution of untransformed 
and transformed gross cost.  
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Q-Q plot of the estimated random effects (A1); histogram of estimated random effects (A2); 
scatterplot of residuals vs. predicted values (B1); histogram of residuals (B2). Residuals are 
calculated as ln(gross cost +1) - linear predictor - random effects. 
Figure 5. Diagnostic plots for LMM model of gross cost. 
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Q-Q plots of the estimated random effects from logistic component (A1) and lognormal 
component (B1); histograms of estimated random effects from logistic component (A2) and 
lognormal component (B2); scatterplot of residuals vs. predicted values from lognormal 
component (C1); histogram of residuals from lognormal component (C2). Residuals are 
calculated as ln(gross cost intensity variable) – linear predictor – random effects. 
 
Figure 6. Diagnostic plots for mixture model of gross cost. 
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Table 8. Unadjusted means and standard deviations of gross cost (in average dollars per 
month) before and after switching, by switch type. 
 Before  After 
Switch Type Mean SD  Mean SD 
PT-Switch 175.5 310.0  177.0 342.3 
PC-No Switch 153.3 259.2  158.7 291.5 
PC-Switch 149.8 240.5  152.8 300.9 
PR-Switch 157.8 229.3  162.7 274.9 
PR-No Switch 158.9 257.8  163.8 291.9 
Standard deviation, SD; Plan termination, PT; plan consolidation, PC; plan renewal, PR. 
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Table 9. Estimated coefficients, confidence limits and p-values from mixture model of gross total cost. 
 Logistic Component  Lognormal Component 
Covariate (reference level) Estimate Confidence 
Interval 
P-value  Estimate Confidence 
Interval 
P-value 
Plan Switch Type (PT-S)        
    PC-NS  0.50 0.28-0.89 0.02  1.01 0.95-1.07 0.81 
    PC-S 0.49 0.25-0.98 0.04  0.96 0.90-1.03 0.27 
    PR-S  0.63 0.34-1.14 0.13  1.01 0.96-1.07 0.66 
    PR-NS 0.66 0.37-1.17 0.15  1.03 0.97-1.09 0.31 
Total Number of Switches 1.58 1.33-1.87 <.01  1.00 0.98-1.02 0.89 
        
Residual Variance 3.29** -- --  0.52 0.52-0.53 <.01 
Random Effect Variance 85.62 74.12-97.12 <.01  1.44 1.40-1.47 <.01 
Random effect covariance *** 1.34 1.14-1.54 <.01  1.34 1.14-1.54 <.01 
*Occurrence or intensity model 
**Not estimated--residual variance from logistic models is always π2/3 = 3.290. 
***Random effect covariance is not component-specific 
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Table 10. Estimated coefficients, confidence limits and p-values from LMM of gross total 
cost. 
Covariate (reference level) Estimate Confidence 
Interval 
P-value 
Plan Switch Type (PT-S)    
    PC-NS  0.99 0.93-1.05 0.76 
    PC-S 0.97 0.90-1.04 0.37 
    PR-S  1.01 0.95-1.07 0.87 
    PR-NS 1.03 0.97-1.09 0.37 
Total Number of Switches 1.06 1.04-1.08 <.01 
    
Residual Variance 0.66 0.65-0.67 <.01 
Random Effect Variance 0.94 2.49-2.61 <.01 
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Schematic summary of significant differences from lognormal (top half) and logistic (bottom 
half) components of the mixture model controlling for covariates. Omitted groups are not 
significantly different from other groups. A red arrow signifies that the group at the head of the 
arrow had significantly higher spending (or probability of spending >$0) compared to the group 
at the arrow’s tail. Arrow labels represent estimated percent differences. Out of pocket, OOP; 
plan termination—switch, PT-S; plan consolidation—no switch, PC-NS; plan consolidation—
switch, PC-S; plan renewal—no switch, PR-NS; plan renewal—switch, PR-S. 
 
Figure 7. Schematic summary of significant differences in spending among plan switching 
groups from mixture models.  
58 
 
 
 
 
 
Untransformed patient OOP costs (A); log transformed patient OOP cost + 1 modelled in the 
LMM (B); and log transformed intensity variable derived from patient OOP costs and modelled 
by the mixture model (C). 
 
Figure 8. Histograms with normal curves showing the distribution of untransformed and 
transformed patient OOP costs. 
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Q-Q plot of the estimated random effects (A1); histogram of estimated random effects (A2); 
scatterplot of residuals vs. predicted values (B1); histogram of residuals (B2). Residuals are 
calculated as ln(patient OOP cost +1) - linear predictor - random effects. 
 
Figure 9. Diagnostic plots for LMM model of patient OOP costs. 
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Q-Q plots of the estimated random effects from logistic component (A1) and lognormal 
component (B1); histograms of estimated random effects from logistic component (A2) and 
lognormal component (B2); scatterplot of residuals vs. predicted values from lognormal 
component (C1); histogram of residuals from lognormal component (C2). Residuals are 
calculated as ln(patient OOP intensity variable) – linear predictor – random effects. 
 
Figure 10. Diagnostic plots for mixture model of patient OOP costs. 
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Table 11. Unadjusted means and standard deviations of patient OOP cost (in average 
dollars per month) before and after switching, by switch type. 
 Before  After 
Switch Type Mean SD  Mean SD 
PT-Switch 53.4 68.6  52.1 66.3 
PC-No Switch 58.4 79.1  56.7 73.0 
PC-Switch 58.4 81.9  54.9 76.4 
PR-Switch 57.4 73.3  55.4 75.0 
PR-No Switch 54.0 66.8  54.3 68.2 
Standard deviation, SD; Plan termination, PT; plan consolidation, PC; plan renewal, PR. 
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Table 12. Estimated coefficients, confidence limits and p-values from mixture model of patient OOP cost. 
 Logistic Component  Lognormal Component 
Covariate (reference level) Estimate Confidence 
Interval 
P-value  Estimate Confidence 
Interval 
P-value 
Plan Switch Type (PT-S)        
    PC-NS  0.61 0.40-0.95 0.03  1.02 0.97-1.08 0.39 
    PC-S 0.56 0.34-0.92 0.02  0.99 0.93-1.06 0.74 
    PR-S  0.55 0.37-0.88 0.01  0.96 0.91-1.02 0.20 
    PR-NS 0.74 0.48-1.12 0.15  1.04 0.98-1.09 0.19 
Total Number of Switches 1.18 1.08-1.29 <.01  1.01 1.00-1.03 0.06 
        
Residual Variance 3.29** -- --  0.50 0.50-0.51 <.01 
Random Effect Variance 13.11 11.35-14.86 <.01  0.57 0.56-0.59 0.57 
Random effect covariance *** 0.93 0.86-1.01 <.01  0.93 0.87-1.01 <.01 
*Occurrence or intensity model 
**Not estimated--residual variance from logistic models is always π2/3 = 3.290. 
***Random effect covariance is not component-specific 
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Table 13. Estimated coefficients, confidence limits and p-values from LMM of patient OOP 
cost. 
Covariate (reference level) Estimate Confidence 
Interval 
P-value 
Plan Switch Type (PT-S)    
    PC-NS  0.99 0.94-1.05 0.81 
    PC-S 0.97 0.91-1.04 0.39 
    PR-S  0.94 0.89-1.00 0.05 
    PR-NS 
1.02 0.97-1.08 0.46 
Total Number of Switches 1.01 1.01-1.02 <.01 
    
Residual Variance 0.08 0.08-0.08 <.01 
Random Effect Variance 0.10 0.09-0.10 <.01 
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